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IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES TO PROCEEDING BELOW 
In addition to the parties named in the caption, there 
were two other defendants in the proceeding below. Defendant 
Gerald H. Burton was dismissed before trial pursuant to a 
stipulation between the parties. Defendant City of 
Springville, a municipal corporation, prevailed on a motion for 
a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence. Neither 
Mr. Burton nor the City of Springville i$ affected by this 
appeal. 
Since there are multiple parties to this appeal and 
since separate appeals have been filed by these parties, the 
defendant-appellant, The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad 
Company, will be referred to herein as the "Rio Grande" or the 
"railroad." The plaintiff-respondent, Robert L. Gleave, will 
be referred to as "Mr. Gleave." The defendant-respondent, Utah 
State Department of Transportation, will be referred to as 
"UDOT" and the Utah State Public Service Commission as the 
"UPSC." The defendant-appellant, Utah Railway Company, is, for 
all purposes relevant to this appeal, in the same position as 
the Rio Grande and references herein to the Rio Grande shall be 
deemed to also refer to the Utah Railway Company. 
The Rio Grande and Mr. Gleave filed separate appeals. 
The two separate appeals were consolidated by an order of this 
Court and, since the consolidated case bears the same 
-i-
case number as the appeal filed by the Rio Grande, the appeal 
of Mr. Gleave has now been designated as a cross-appeal. 
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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS AND CROSS-RESPONDENTS THE DENVER AND 
RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY AND UTAH RAILWAY COMPANY 
ARGUMENT 
I. REPLY TO UDOTfS BRIEF 
A. THE STATE'S POSITION IS INCONSISTENT, AND IS 
BASED UPON MISCHARACTERIZATION OF UTAH 
LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS. 
In Point I of its Brief, The St^te of Utah argues that 
"railroad crossing safety is clearly a governmental function." 
Brief of the State of Utah, Department of Transportation 
(hereafter "UDOT Brief") at 5. The State acknowledges that to 
be a "governmental function," an activity must be "of such 
unique nature that it can only be performed by a governmental 
agency. . ." UDOT Brief at 3 (emphasis added). It argues that 
activities such as the selection of traffic control devices for 
a particular crossing and the allocation of funds for such 
devices, are matters which "shall be performed by a 
governmental agency" and which are "qualitatively different" 
from what would be obtained by private [Railroad] oversight." 
UDOT Brief at 4 & 5 (emphasis added.) 
The State next contends that when it engages in this 
activity, it utilizes a team of "transportation experts" who 
"weigh the numerous factors" and decide if the "cost of more 
adequate safety devices" at a particular crossing is outweighed 
by the benefit to be obtained. UDOT Brief at 9. The State 
notes that the "basic governmental program involved is the 
uniform supervision and regulation of railroad crossings 
throughout the State" (UDOT Brief at 7) and that the "safety of 
a particular crossing must be evaluated in relation to the 
safety of every other railroad crossing in the State." UDOT 
Brief at 8. 
In summary, the State's position, as expressed in 
Point I of its Brief, is that the determination and 
implementation of traffic control measures at railroad 
crossings is an activity that can only be done by the State 
and that the State has accepted this responsibility and 
employed teams of transportation experts who discharge this 
essential governmental function with the utmost discretion. 
Nevertheless, in Point II of its Brief, the State takes the 
inconsistent and even absurd position that the function which 
it just described is not really exclusively a governmental one. 
The State does not attempt to explain with whom or how 
this function is "shared." Nor does it attempt to square this 
new concept of non-exclusive authority with its previous 
pronouncements that regulation in this field is something which 
can only be done by government. The State would appear to want 
its authority to be non-exclusive only in those instances where 
it would otherwise be the exclusive defendant. 
To support its new claim that its authority to 
regulate crossing protection is somehow and to some extent 
nonexclusive, the State first cites what it asserts to be a 
"conspicuous deletion" in 1975 of the word "exclusive" from the 
text of Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15. This is a serious 
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mischaracterization of the 1975 amendment. The 1975 amendment 
of Section 54-4-15 coincided with the creation of UDOT and the 
compiler notes that the only purpose for the amendment was to 
substitute UDOT for the Public Service Commission ("PSC"). 6A 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15, Compiler's Notes (Supp. 1983). A new 
subsection was added to the statute to give the PSC "exclusive" 
supervisory authority over UDOT. If the word "exclusive" had 
not been dropped from the paragraphs discussing the power of 
UDOT and moved to the new subsection discussing the powers of 
the PSC, an argument could have been made that UDOT was not 
subject to PSC review. The 1975 amendment merely designated a 
new State agency to have primary jurisdiction over the 
regulation of railroad crossings. There is nothing in the 
amendment to suggest that it was enacted to eliminate the 
exclusive nature of the State's authority and vest authority in 
private entities (railroad's) to regulate vehicular traffic at 
railroad crossings. See Rio Grande's Opening Brief at 32-33. 
The State also mischaracterizes Utah Code Ann. § 
56-1-11. This statute provides that "Evfery railroad shall be 
liable for damages by its neglect to make and maintain good and 
sufficient crossings at points where any line of travel 
crosses its road." Id. (emphasis added). Section 56-1-11 
does not impose any duty to remove visual obstructions near a 
railroad-highway crossing, nor does it impose any duty to 
install traffic safety devices. Rather, Section 56-1-11 only 
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imposes a duty to maintain the road surface between the rails 
or immediately adjacent to the rails at a highway crossing. 
In Denkers v. Southern Pacific Co., 52 Utah 18, 171 
P. 999 (1918), the Utah Supreme Court explained that the 
statutory phrase ,fgood and sufficient crossing" is understood 
to refer to a crossing's "width, the grade of the approaches 
thereto, the kind of material to be used in its construction on 
either side of the railroad tracks, and the kind of ballast 
that shall be used to fill in between the ties and rails, 
etc." 52 Utah at 26-27, 171 P. at 1102,, (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed this interpretation in Van 
Wagoner v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 112 Utah 189, 186 P.2d 
293 (1947). In that case, the Court approved a jury 
instruction which described the statutory obligation of Section 
56-1-11 as follows: ,f[T]he railroad company is only obligated 
to maintain the approaches to the crossing for a distance of 
two feet on the outside of its rail and is not liable for 
defects in the highway or approach to said crossing if said 
defects are more than two feet from the outside of either 
rail." 112 Utah at 218, 186 P.2d at 305 (emphasis added). 
The State does not go so far as to suggest that 
Section 56-1-11, or for that matter any other statute, actually 
confers upon the Rio Grande the authority to implement traffic 
control devices at railroad crossings. If railroads did have 
that power, most crossings would be closed and railroads would 
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erect "dead end" or "do not enter" signs. Allowing a highway 
to cross over railroad tracks seldom, if ever, provides benefit 
to the railroad. It is only the exclusive nature of the 
State's authority that prevents railroads from implementing 
their own crossing regulation. Yet, the State for some reason 
"feels constrained" to contest this point. The State's 
position is all the more puzzling since the exclusive nature of 
its authority to determine crossing protection is not even at 
issue in this appeal. 
The lower court instructed the jury that the 
determination "regarding crossing design and crossing warning 
and safety is placed under the control of UDOT" and the 
railroad cannot be found "negligent based upon any defects 
which might exist with respect to the design of the 1600 South 
crossing or based upon any problems you may perceive in the 
lack of traffic warning devices at the 1600 South crossing." 
Jury Instruction No. 13, Exhibit "0" to Rio Grande's Opening 
Brief. No party has claimed that portion of the instructions 
to have been erroneous. Indeed, the State even asserts that a 
decision regarding the exclusive nature of its authority is 
"irrelevant" to the only issue which involves the State in this 
appeal. UDOT Brief at 12. The State just "feels constrained" 
to challenge any assertion that its authority is exclusive. 
Id. 
Despite the State's incomprehensible "feeling" that it 
must challenge its own exclusive authority, the fact remains 
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that its authority to determine appropriate crossing protection 
is exclusive. Motorists such as Mr. Gleave, railroads, and 
other private citizens have no power to change traffic signs at 
railroad crossings unless a governmental agency authorizes the 
change. It is nonsense for the State to claim otherwise, 
especially after arguing that the regulation of highway traffic 
at railroad crossings is something that can only be done by 
governmental entities. 
The State, nevertheless, appears to make some sense 
when it claims UDOT would not prevent the Rio Grande from 
slowing its trains or removing visual obstructions at this 
particular crossing. UDOT Brief at 14. This unsupported 
"testimony,,f however, misses the point. The point is that the 
crossing protection for this particular crossing was mandated 
by the State because of the particular train speed and view 
obstructions that existed at that place. The issue raised by 
the Rio Grande's appeal is not whether the State would prevent 
it from reducing train speeds, but rather, can a railroad be 
negligent if it was operating at the speed the State expected 
of it when the State decided upon the appropriate crossing 
protection for motorists at that crossing? 
In Point I of its Brief, the State elaborately 
discusses how its team of experts weighs all the factors and 
utilizes its utmost discretion to decide what type of crossing 
protection to implement at a particular crossing. In this 
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case, there is no dispute that key factors considered at this 
crossing were the train speed of 50 miles per hour and the view 
obstructions. While the State may not have prevented the 
railroad from changing these factors, it may well have 
downgraded the crossing protection by removing the stop signs 
had the railroad decided to remove the visual obstructions or 
reduce its train speeds. 
The State's use of stop signs at railroad crossings 
must be particularly judicious. Stop signs are passive 
restraints. They depend upon motorist acceptance to be 
effective. The more often they are used unnecessarily in 
traffic control, the more often they are disregarded by 
motorists. This is especially true with respect to railroad 
crossings. If stop signs were placed at all crossings, 
motorists would soon become conditioned to regard them as 
nothing more than crossbucks. Stop signs must be used 
sparingly at railroad crossings, so that motorists will know 
there is something especially hazardous about a crossing which 
has one. 
The State's exclusive authority to determine the type 
of crossing protection to be employed at a particular crossing 
remains inextricably wed to the factors tohich it considered in 
the exercise of that exclusive authority. If the railroad has 
no power to change the crossing protection, it cannot be 
negligent if it operates within the parameters expected of it 
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by the State when the State determined what signs or other 
devices were required to make the crossing safe. See Rio 
Grande Opening Brief at 34-37. 
B. REGULATION OF CROSSING SAFETY DEVICES IS NOT 
INHERENTLY AN ESSENTIAL GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION; 
RATHER, THE STATE HAS CHOSEN TO HAVE THAT 
FUNCTION DONE EXCLUSIVELY BY STATE AGENCIES. 
It is important to note that the State's inconsistent 
position also inverts the proper analysis for sovereign 
immunity. The State argues that it is immune to suit because 
its regulation of railroad crossing protection is something 
that can only be done by government, yet it believes the Utah 
Legislature in 1975 eliminated its exclusive authority in this 
area. In truth, the situation is just the opposite. 
The regulation of highway traffic over railroad 
crossings should be more uniform and probably even better if 
this power is given exclusively to governmental entities. This 
does not mean, however, that this activity is inherently 
something that can only be done by the State. Indeed, prior to 
this century, railroads did decide what, if any, crossing signs 
to erect. Neither can one consider this function to be 
"essential to the core of governmental activity." Standiford 
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 604 P.2d 1230, 1237 (1980). 
Governments can exist and function satisfactorily without ever 
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regulating railroad crossing signs. This is not inherently a 
"governmental function" which would provide the State with 
sovereign immunity. 
The power to decide what safety devices are to be 
employed at railroad crossings in this State could have been 
given to railroads and, had this been done, railroads would 
undoubtedly be held accountable for any negligence in the 
exercise of this power. However, in this State, neither 
railroads nor motorists have the power to implement or change 
the safety devices at railroad crossings. The Utah Legislature 
has chosen to give this power exclusively to State agencies. 
If the State is negligent in the discharge of this exclusive 
duty, and if this negligence causes the death or injury of a 
motorist, the only recourse is against the State. The State 
and only the State decides whether the protection at a 
particular crossing is adequate for the safety of motorists 
approaching that crossing. If that power is exercised 
negligently, the State must be subject to suit or the motorist 
will have no redress for that negligence. This is not an 
essential governmental function, but it is one which by choice 
the State has undertaken and precluded its private citizens 
from doing. The State does not and should not have immunity 
from suit for the negligent exercise of this power. See Rio 
Grande's Opening Brief at 42-49. 
Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-13, wherein railroads, not 
state agencies, are required to establish certain protection 
(fencing) for livestock on land traversed by railroad tracks. 
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II. REPLY TO MR. GLEAVEfS BRIEF--RIO GRANDEfS APPEAL 
A. MR. GLEAVE WAS AT LEAST 11 NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER 
OF LAW, AND THE JURY VERDICT MUST BE SET ASIDE 
AND A NEW TRIAL ORDERED 
Mr. Gleave argues in Point I of his brief (pp. 6-11) 
that there was evidence from which a jury could conclude that 
the Rio Grande was 100% negligent and that Mr. Gleave was 
entirely without fault. However, a jury cannot change legal 
standards set by the Supreme Court of this State and Mr. Gleave 
completely ignores the numerous Utah railroad crossing cases 
cited and quoted at pages 15-23 of the Rio Grande's opening 
brief. These cases establish the legal standard for 
"reasonable" conduct of motorists approaching railroad 
crossings in Utah. The Rio Grande's contention that those 
cases compel a finding that Mr. Gleave was negligent as a 
matter of law is not even addressed by Mr. Gleavefs brief and 
now stands unrebutted. 
The jury's failure to attribute at least 1% fault to 
Mr. Gleave can mean only that the jury failed to hold Mr. 
Gleave to the minimum standard of "reasonable" conduct required 
of him under Utah law. It is undisputed that Mr. Gleave 
started to go across the crossing, while looking in the 
direction of his relatively unobstructed view (to the right), 
rather than in the direction of his highly obstructed view (to 
the left.) (Tr. 1759-1760). In so proceeding, Mr. Gleave 
breached his standard of care as a matter of law, thereby 
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making it incumbent upon the jury to find that he was at least 
1% negligent. See Rio Grande's Opening Brief at 4-12, 15-23. 
Despite Mr. Gleave's contentions to the contrary, his 
expert Mr. Van Wagoner did not provide any evidence to warrant 
a finding of 0% fault on the part of Mr. Gleave. The portion 
of Mr. Van Wagoner's testimony reproduced at page 8 of Mr. 
Gleave's brief simply does not support a jury finding of 0% 
fault on the part of Mr. Gleave. First, Mr. Van Wagoner did 
not offer any testimony as to what Mr. Gleave in fact did on 
the morning of the accident. Second, the testimony that Mr. 
Van Wagoner did offer bordered on the banal. In substance, Mr. 
Van Wagoner testified that a train will strike a car every time 
a car proceeds across the crossing without leaving enough time 
to get to the other side before the train reaches the 
crossing. Stated otherwise, there will be a collision every 
time an automobile and a train are on th£ same tracks at the 
same time. 
Although the Rio Grande believes there was 
insufficient evidence to support a verdict that it was 
negligent, for the purposes of this appeal, the Court must 
decide only whether the jury verdict attributing 0% fault to 
Mr. Gleave is supported by the evidence and by the case law 
governing the standard of care required of an automobile driver 
at a railroad crossing. 
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B. THE RIO GRANDE WAS DEPRIVED OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY 
With regard to the Rio Grande's contention that this 
Court should order a new trial because the Rio Grande was 
deprived of its due process right to an impartial jury, Mr. 
Gleave?s brief has completely failed to respond to the cases 
cited at pages 23-28 of the Rio Grande's initial brief. Mr. 
Gleave?s brief states that the question of juror bias should be 
resolved on procedural grounds. Specifically, Mr. Gleave 
maintains that the judgment should be affirmed because the 
record is allegedly incomplete. Mr. Gleave claims that Dr. 
Mendenhallfs name was mentioned to the jury during a portion of 
the voir dire which, according to an affidavit filed by 
counsel for Mr. Gleave, was not transcribed by the court 
reporter. 
There are several problems with Mr. Gleave's 
procedural argument. First, the only "evidence" that the 
transcript is incomplete is a hearsay statement attributed to 
lower court reporter Stanley Roundy in the affidavit filed by 
Mr. Gleavefs counsel. (A copy of the affidavit is appended to 
Mr. Gleave's brief). Second, the official transcript of the 
voir dire proceedings (Tr. 1655-1675) indicates on the face 
of it that the voir dire was only interrupted by one 
off-the-record bench conference between the court and counsel. 
(Tr. 1662-1663). Third, the portion of the transcript where 
Mr. Gleave's counsel identified his witnesses (Tr. 1659-1660) 
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shows that Mr. Gleave's counsel did not identify Dr. 
Mendenhall as a prospective witness. Fourth, Juror Argyle 
testified in her affidavit that, to the best of her 
recollection, Dr. John Mendenhall was not named as a 
prospective witness during the questioning of prospective 
jurors. (Tr. 799; a copy of the Argyle Affidavit is attached 
as Exhibit I in the addendum to the Rio Grande's initial brief). 
More importantly, even if the record is incomplete, 
the fact remains that Juror Argyle had a close relationship 
with a key witness for the plaintiff which she did not reveal 
to counsel and the court. Counsel for the plaintiff did not 
identify Dr. Mendenhall during voir dire, but even if he did, 
the trial was not to an impartial jury. Counsel for Mr. Gleave 
merely attempts to shift the blame from himself to Juror 
Argyle. If counsel did identify Dr. Mendenhall as a plaintiff 
witness, Juror Argyle should have revealed to the court the 
nature of her association with the doctor before she retired to 
deliberate with the rest of the jury. 
Regardless of whether the fault lies with plaintiff's 
counsel or Juror Argyle, the Rio Grande was deprived of its 
right to trial by an impartial jury. As stated in Anderton v. 
Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828, 835 (Utah 1980), "[A] trial court 
may order a new trial should it appear that juror bias crept 
into the proceeding notwithstanding voir dire questioning." 
Id. (emphasis added). The essential point is not who made the 
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mistake; it is that a mistake was made and that only a new 
trial can correct it. 
C. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT REVERSE ITS DENIAL OF 
THE RIP'S GRANDE'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AT TRIAL 
Mr. Gleave contends at Point III of his brief (pp. 
13-14) that any error by the lower court: in denying the Rio 
Grande's motion for partial summary judgment is moot because 
the lower court allegedly reversed himself by the time of 
trial. In support of that position, Mr. Gleave cites the first 
paragraph of Instruction No. 13 (Tr. 737; a copy of instruction 
No. 13 is attached as Exhibit 0 in the addendum to the Rio 
Grande's initial brief). Although the first paragraph of 
Instruction No. 13 is, indeed, a correct statement of the law, 
the second paragraph of Instruction No. 13 is fundamentally 
inconsistent with the Rio Grande's motion for partial summary 
judgment (and with the first paragraph of instruction No. 13). 
Notwithstanding Mr. Gleave's contentions to the contrary, the 
trial court did not reverse its decision denying the Rio 
Grande's motion for partial summary judgment. As a result, Mr. 
Gleave was allowed to argue to the jury that the Rio Grande had 
violated duties which, in fact, did not exist under the 
undisputed facts of this case. 
D. THE RIO GRANDE HAS NOT WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO 
COMPLAIN ABOUT PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL'S SURPRISE AND 
IMPROPER REFERENCE TO WILLIS WOODARD'S TESTIMONY 
IN CLOSING ARGUMENT 
Mr. Gleave argues in Point IV of his brief (pp. 15-18) 
that the Rio Grande has failed to preserve for appeal purposes 
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any right to complain about Mr, Gleave's counsel's rebuttal 
argument based on the testimony of witness Willis Woodard. In 
fact, Rio Grande properly preserved the Woodard issue as an 
appeal point by filing a timely motion for a new trial 
regarding the Woodard testimony pursuant to Rule 59(a)(3), 
U.R.C.P. When counsel for Mr. Gleave argued Mr. Woodard1s 
testimony to the jury during rebuttal, the Rio Grande was 
surprised, and no degree of ordinary prudence could have 
protected the Rio Grande against such litigation tactics. 
The lower court's dismissal of Mr. Woodard from the 
stand during the middle of his direct examination was 
extraordinary. (Tr. 1788-1804). Such extraordinary action 
could hardly be interpreted to mean that Mr. Woodward's 
incomplete, and not subject to cross examination, testimony was 
proper evidence for the jury to consider. (See Tr. 1803). 
Once counsel for Mr. Gleave commented upon this testimony to 
the jury, any objection or "curative" instruction would only 
have drawn more attention to this testimony and exacerbated the 
damage already done. Counsel for Mr. Gleave must have acted 
purposefully when he chose to taint this jury by referring to 
the testimony he so improperly elicited in the first place. 
The only effective remedy is a new trial and this was requested 
of the lower court. 
The surprise reference to Mr. Woodard's testimony did 
not constitute harmless error under Rule 61, U.R.C.P. because 
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the only "evidence" that the Rio Grande engineer failed to 
sound the whistle properly was the testimony of Mr. Woodard--
testimony which was improperly elicited, was not subject to 
cross-examination, and was improperly argued to the jury. 
Counsel for Mr. Gleave obviously determined that Mr. Woodard?s 
testimony regarding the sounding of the whistle to be 
significant enough to mention to the jury during his final 
presentation, just moments before the jury retired to 
deliberate. He cannot now claim this to have been of no 
consequence. 
E. THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO ALLOW 
THE JURY TO CONSIDER WHETHER MR. GLEAVE FAILED TO 
MITIGATE HIS DAMAGES BY NOT WEARING HIS 
SEATBELTS. 
Mr. Gleave argues at Point V of his brief (pp. 18-24) 
that there was no evidence in the record to support a seatbelt/ 
mitigation of damages instruction. In fact, there was ample 
evidence presented to justify the requested instruction. Mr. 
Gleavefs own treating physician (Dr. Mendenhall) testified that 
the injuries to Mr. Gleavefs knee and ankle (which resulted in 
Mr. Gleave's permanent partial disability) were injuries 
sustained by Mr. Gleave after being ejected from his vehicle 
and upon coming into contact with the asphalt. (Tr. 
1209-1211). The relevant testimony of Dr. Mendenhall is 
attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit "A". 
Dr. Mendenhallfs opinion is supported by additional 
evidence. Mr. Gleave admitted that he was not wearing his 
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seatbelt. (Tr. 1750). Plaintiff's Exhibit 2(h) is an 8x10" 
color photograph of plaintiff's vehicle as it appeared after 
being struck by the Rio Grande's train. The photograph shows 
that the front windshield on the vehicle was not broken despite 
the complete and total damage to the front end of the vehicle. 
Further evidence regarding the lack of damage to the windows is 
found at page 4 of defendant's Exhibit 34. Defendant's Exhibit 
34 (a copy of which is attached to the Rio Grande's opening 
brief as Exhibit J) is the investigating officer's report of 
the traffic accident; it states: "Vehicle, a 1975 Chev Monza 
appeared to be totaled. all [sic] windshields and side windows 
appeared in tact [sic] with the exception of the drivers [sic] 
side window which was down (probable point of ejection.)" 
Id. The jury also heard uncontradicted testimony from the 
author of Exhibit 34 (Springville police officer Coron) 
concerning his visual inspection of the vehicle's passenger 
compartment on the morning of the accident: 
Mr. Richman: In terms of your investigation did 
you ever take a look at the car? 
Officer Coron: The car itself, yes, sir. 
Mr. Richman: Did you look into the interior 
passenger compartment, driver compartment? 
Officer Coron: Yes, sir, I did. 
Mr. Richman: Can you describe to the jury, 
please, if you would, Sergeant, what that looked 
like inside? 
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Officer Coron: It was basically intact. There 
was no great structural damage to the passenger 
compartment. 
(Tr. 1426-1427). 
Mr. Gleave contends that the Rio Grande was not 
entitled to a "seatbelt" instruction on mitigation of damages 
because the Rio Grande failed to produce an expert witness on 
that point. Although our judicial system seems to be relying 
more and more upon experts, we have yet to reach the point that 
the only proper evidence to permit an attorney to argue a point 
to the jury must come from the lips of an expert witness. The 
need for establishing a causal connection between Mr. Gleavers 
failure to wear an available seatbelt and the damages sustained 
by this omission can be proved by any competent evidence which 
is admissible and which tends to show that the injuries were 
aggravated by the failure of Mr. Gleave to wear an available 
seatbelt. 
Having demonstrated (1) that Mr. Gleave was not 
wearing his seatbelt, (2) that the passenger compartment and 
windows of plaintiff's vehicle remained intact even after the 
collision, and (3) that Mr. Gleavefs own doctor agreed that Mr. 
Gleave's injuries were consistent with the sort of injuries 
that were sustained outside the passenger compartment, the Rio 
Grande was entitled to argue to the jury and have it determine 
whether Mr. Gleave could have reduced the extent of his damages 
by wearing a seatbelt. 
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III. REPLY TO MR. GLEAVE'S CROSS-APPEAL 
A. PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST ON THAT PORTION OF HIS DAMAGES 
DESIGNATED BY THE JURY AS "LOST FUTURE EARNINGS" 
The first point raised by Mr. Gleavefs cross-appeal is 
his contention that the lower court erred in refusing to award 
him 8% prejudgment interest on that $275>000 portion of his 
damages denominated by the jury as "loss of future earnings and 
earning capacity" (R. 767)" (i.e., the earnings that Mr. Gleave 
would not earn subsequent to the time of the trial). 
Mr. Gleave asserts that his position is based on Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-44 (1953, as amended). However, Section 
78-27-44, enacted in 1975, provides in pertinent part: 
In all actions brought to recover damages for 
personal injuries sustained by any person. . . . 
it shall be lawful for the plaintiff in the 
complaint to claim interest on the special 
damages alleged from the date of the occurrence 
of the act giving rise to the cause of action 
and it shall be the duty of the court, in 
entering judgment for plaintiff in that action, 
to add to the amount of damages assessed by the 
verdict of the jury, or found by the court, 
interest on that amount calculated at 8% per 
annum from the date of the occurrence of the act 
giving rise to the cause of action to the date of 
entering the judgment, and to include it in that 
judgment. 
Id. (emphas i s added). 
Mr. Gleave's cross-appeal is contrary to both the 
letter and spirit of Section 78-27-44. The letter of the 
statute expressly provides that prejudgment interest shall only 
apply to "that amount" of special damages prayed for in the 
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complaint "alleged from the date of the occurrence of the act 
giving rise to the cause of action." Id. Under Section 
78-27-44, therefore, damages which did not accrue to Mr. Gleave 
between "the date of the occurrence" and the time of trial do 
not qualify for prejudgment interest. Consistent with the 
letter of Section 78-27-44, the lower court did award Mr. 
Gleave $14,179.81 prejudgment interest on his prejudgment 
special damages, including his prejudgment medical expenses and 
the $20,000 portion of his damages denominated by the jury as 
"past lost wages" (i.e. wages lost between the date of the 
accident and the date of the trial). 
Mr. Gleavefs claim for prejudgment interest on wages 
lost subsequent to the trial date also violates the spirit of 
the prejudgment interest statute. The Legislature intended no 
more than to provide successful personal injury plaintiffs a 
reasonable award for prejudgment interest on out-of-pocket 
damages sustained by the plaintiff between the time of injury 
and the time of trial. The Legislature did not intend that 
personal injury plaintiffs would reap a windfall. 
There is an additional important reason to reject Mr. 
Gleave's construction of Section 78-27-44. Namely, the jury's 
$275,000 award of lost future earning capacity was based on the 
jury's evaluation of the detailed "present value" testimony of 
expert witness Frank Stuart. (Tr. 1518-1576). Mr. Stuart 
testified that he assumed (1) that Mr. Gleave's base salary 
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would have increased at an average rate of 8.2% per year and 
(2) that the average annual rate of return for a diversified 
portfolio of investments would be 7.89%. (Tr. 1524-1529). As 
such, the jury's $275,000 award to Mr. Gleave's for lost future 
earning capacity already reflects the jury's considered 
evaluation of the discounted present value of Mr. Gleave's 
future stream of anticipated income. 
B. THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER GRANTING THE RIO 
GRANDE'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT ON 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
' 
The second point raised by Mr. Gleave's cross-appeal 
is that the lower court erred in granting at the close of 
plaintiff's evidence the Rio Grande's motion for a directed 
verdict on Mr. Gleave's claim for punitive damages. In fact, 
even when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to 
plaintiff, a jury could never award punitive damages. The 
lower court's order granting a directed verdict on punitive 
damages should be affirmed. 
Mr. Gleave's claim for punitive damages is wholly at 
odds with the testimony of his own expert witness Van Wagoner. 
Specifically, at page 29 of his brief--and similarly when he 
argued against the directed verdict motion in front of the 
lower court (Tr. 1353)--Mr. Gleave puts forth the bizarre 
proposition that the Rio Grande should be penalized with 
punitive damages for asking to have a stop sign installed at 
the subject crossing. However, even Mr. Van Wagoner 
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unequivocally testified that the Rio Grande's desire to have a 
stop sign at the subject crossing made sense as a temporary 
measure (i.e., until UDOT obtained Federal funds to install 
active signals): 
Mr. Richman: Okay. But if UDOT made the 
recommendation, that is the Utah Department of 
Transportation, at least on a temporary basis 
that a stop sign should go in there, you would at 
least believe preliminary [sic] they didn't make 
that decision indiscriminately, would you not? 
Mr. Van Wagoner: That is correct. And frankly 
as an interim measure I would have suggested the 
same thing. 
(Tr. 1627; accord Tr. 1628). The fact that the State, for 
financial or other reasons, still has not implemented flashing 
lights at this crossing does not make the railroad's request of 
a stop sign wrongful. Before the railroad requested a stop 
sign, this crossing was only protected by cross bucks. Even 
Mr. Gleave's expert believed the stop sign was an improvement 
which he would have suggested. 
The uncontroverted evidence in this case is that there 
were no prior accidents at the crossing as of 1974 when the 
UDOT surveillance team recommended installation of the stop 
sign. (Tr. 1240-1241). For Mr. Gleave to suggest that it was 
"willful and malicious" or even "reckless" for the Rio Grande 
to want a stop sign contradicts common sense and all the 
evidence. No conceivable social purpose could be served by 
punishing the Rio Grande for wanting UDOT to install a stop 
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sign at this crossing; the lower court's ruling on the question 
of punitive damages should be affirmed. 
None of the cases from other jurisdictions cited at 
pages 31 and 33 of Mr. Gleavefs brief add anything to the 
mature body of modern Utah case law concerning punitive 
damages. Moreover, the foreign cases cited by Mr. Gleave, 
arose against very different statutory backgrounds, do not 
apply the same standards recognized in Utah, and do not involve 
fact situations remotely similar to this case. 
On page 31 of his brief, Mr. Gleave does cite six Utah 
cases following this statement: "Utah has recently allowed 
punitive damages in a wide variety of circumstances." Gleave 
Brief at 31. This, of course, is true. But no Utah Court has 
ever suggested that punitive damages would be proper in a case 
similar to this one. 
This Court has stated that punitive damages generally 
are not appropriate and must be allowed bnly where to do so 
would "serve a societal interest of punishing and deterring 
outrageous and malicious conduct which is not likely to be 
deterred by other means." Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospitals, 
Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted). 
In this instance, there is no evidence of willful or 
malicious conduct. There is not even any evidence that the 
railroad consciously disregarded the public safety of others, a 
standard which under Utah law would not justify punitive 
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damages. If the Rio Grande were to try this case to a 
completely impartial jury, with proper jury instructions and no 
references by plaintiff to improperly elicited testimony, it is 
doubtful that the railroad would even be found to have been 
negligent in this instance. The trial court did not err in 
dismissing plaintiff's claims for punitive damages. 
CONCLUSION: RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse 
the judgment entered by the lower court, reinstate the Amended 
Complaint as against co-defendant UDOT, and remand for a new 
trial. During the new trial, the jury should be instructed 
See Gleave Brief at 31. In Terry v. ZCMI, 605 P.2d 314 
(Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court held that legal malice 
could support a punitive damage award in a false imprisonment 
case. A subsequent decision, Branch v. Western Petroleum, 
Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982) followed Terry and these two 
cases were noted in dicta in Behrens v. Raleigh Hills 
Hospital, Inc. 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983). The 
foundation for this line of cases, Terry v. ZCMI, was 
overruled in McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 
1984) wherein this Court held actual malice and not mere legal 
malice was required to support a punitive damage award. See 
also, First Security Bank v. J.B.J. Feedyards, 653 P.2d 591, 
598 (Utah 1982) ("Such damages [i.e., punitive damages] may be 
awarded where the nature of the wrong complained of and the 
injury inflicted goes beyond merely violating the rights of 
another in that it is found to be willful and malicious."); 
Kesler y. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 359 (Utah 1975) (stating that 
the punitive damages remedy should be applied only upon a 
showing of "willful and malicious" conduct when it "seems to 
one's sense of justice that mere recompense for actual loss is 
inadequate," and even then "with caution" because it is an 
extraordinary remedy "outside the field of usual redressful 
remedies"). 
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that the plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law, with the 
jury to determine the degree to which plaintiff's negligence 
and the negligence, if any, of the Rio Gfande and UDOT 
proximately caused this accident. 
With respect to Mr. Gleave's crdss-appeal, this court 
should affirm the lower court's rulings with respect to 
pre-judgment interest and punitive damages. 
DATED this 2^day of June, 1985. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
E. Scott Savage 
Michael F. Richman 
Patrick J. O'Harp. 
By ?cJfaS J. 9 ) k ^ 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
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-25-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellants and Cross-Respondents 
The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroid Company and Utah 
Railway Company were mailed, postage prepaid, this <SW*~ day of 
June, 1985 to: 
Robert J. DeBry 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant 
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
?aul M. Warner 
Assistant Attorney General for the State of Utah 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent Utah Department 
of Transportation 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Reply Brief Addendum Exhibit "A" 
Description: Part of the cross-examination 
testimony of Mr. Gleavefs physician, 
Dr. John Mendenhall, reproduced from 
Tr. 1205, line 12 through Tr. 1211, 
line 1. 
Mr. Richman: You had mentioned, Doctor, that with 
respect to the knee you found in the emergency room a 
lot of direct and foreign material in the knee, is 
that correct, sir? 
Dr. Mendenhall: That is correctt. 
Mr. Richman: Are you aware, Doctor, that Mr. Gleave 
was ejected from his automobile at the time of the 
accident? 
Dr. Mendenhall: Yes. 
Mr. Richman: You have handled, I take it, numerous 
automobile accidents or accidents where people have 
come in contact with asphalt paving, that type of 
thing? 
Dr. Mendenhall: Yes. 
Mr. Richman: More than fifty? 
Dr. Mendenhall: Yes. 
Mr. Richman: And when one corned in contact with 
asphalt paving you would anticipate, would you not, 
that he is going to have some of the gravel or the 
dirt that is on that asphalt paving in the joint that 
came into contact with that pavement? 
Dr. Mendenhall: Yes. 
Mr. Richman: The knee was fairly well ripped up in a 
sense that it was open, muscles and bones were 
showing, isn't that correct? 
Dr. Mendenhall: Correct. 
Mr. Richman: And that is consistent, is it not, with 
banging one's knee on asphalt pavement at high 
velocities? 
Dr. Mendenhall: Yes. 
Mr. Richman: And the fact that: dirt is in his knee 
that is consistent with hitting one's knee on the 
asphalt paving, is that true? 
Dr. Mendenhall: That is correct. 
Mr. Richman: The same scenario we have just gone 
through, that would be true for Mr. Gleavefs foot 
also, would it not? 
Dr. Mendenhall: It could be true for the foot. 
Mr. Richman: Sure. And the elbow, as I recall, that 
was open and muscles and bones were showing on that, 
too, isn't that true? 
Dr. Mendenhall: Correct. 
Mr. Richman: That was a lot of dirt and foreign 
material in there also? 
Dr. Mendenhall: Correct. 
